• Restriction End Date: 2029-06-01

Date: 2024-01-01

Creator: Tingjun Huang

Access: Access restricted to the Bowdoin Community

Date: 2022-01-01

Creator: Levi McAtee

Access: Open access

Do minimum wage increases serve as stepping-stones to higher-paying jobs for low-pay workers? This paper analyzes the impact of state minimum wage policy on the one-year wage growth rates of individuals across the wage distribution and whether that impact changes for individuals in highly monopsonistic industries. I review the recent literature on the disemployment effect, the impact of the minimum wage on wage growth rates, the nature of monopsonistic industries, and the relationship between the minimum wage and monopsony power. I offer theoretical reasons why the minimum wage may impact the wage growth rates of individuals in monopsonistic industries differently than it impacts those of individuals in competitive industries. I then re-estimate Lopresti’s and Mumford’s (2016) panel fixed effects model to determine how the effect of a minimum wage increase depends nonlinearly on the size of the increase. Using data from 2005-2008, Lopresti and Mumford found that small minimum wage increases have a significant negative impact on wage growth rates, while large minimum wage increases have a significant positive impact. Using data from 2016-2019, I find similar results. As my primary empirical contribution, I test whether individuals in highly monopsonistic industries experience minimum wage changes differently than individuals in more competitive industries. I find monopsony power in the form of high labor immobility primarily impacts the wage growth rates of high-pay workers and does not influence how low-pay workers experience minimum wage changes. Finally, I recommend policymakers impose larger minimum wage increases to avoid impeding the wage-growth of low-pay workers.

Date: 2021-01-01

Creator: Gavin T Shilling

Access: Open access

The Great Recession of 2007 and 2008 exposed the risks of excessive borrowing. We learned the essential economic principle that greater leverage harbors greater risk. Although this global economic contraction was driven primarily by booming private credit expansion, economically inefficient incentives in the public sector, such as short-term reelection concerns, may lead politicians to engage in rash deficit- financed, fiscal spending. The primary purpose of this research is to assess the economic costs of heightened, preexisting government leverage on real economic outcomes during recessionary periods, focusing on both banking and non-banking crisis recessions. In both advanced economies and emerging economies, this study confirms that banking recessions are associated with more severe economic contractions and more persistent output declines than normal recessions. In advanced economies, GDP recovers quickly and strongly with expansionary and supportive fiscal policy during low debt recessions, even with depressed private investment. While GDP recovers slowly and weakly with less expansionary fiscal policy during high debt recessions, even with strong private investment. Thus, the social marginal benefit of public sector investment exceeds the social marginal benefit of private sector investment in advanced economies. In emerging economies, GDP recovers quickly and strongly with strong private investment during high debt recessions, even with weak fiscal spending. While GDP recovers slowly and weakly with depressed private investment during low debt recessions, even with expansionary and supportive fiscal policy. Thus, the social marginal benefit of private sector investment exceeds the social marginal benefit of public sector investment in emerging economies.

Date: 2022-01-01

Creator: Maynor Alberto Loaisiga Bojorge

Access: Open access

For most of their histories, Costa Rica and Honduras were primarily agricultural societies with little economic diversification. However, around 1990, after the implementation of Washington Consensus reforms, the economies of both nations began to diverge. Costa Rica’s economy rapidly expanded for the following 30 years, while Honduras remained stagnant. Through a New Institutional Economics approach, I argue that institutional differences between Costa Rica and Honduras are responsible for the impressive economic growth Costa Rica has been able to achieve in the past few decades. Specifically, early political developments in Costa Rica have deeply imbedded relatively egalitarian values into the population, helping shape formal and informal inclusive political institutions. Meanwhile, Honduras experienced the development of extractive political institutions, as political and economic power was heavily concentrated in the hands of a select few. These political institutions were crucial during the implementation stages of Washington Consensus reforms, as strong and inclusive political institutions attracted Foreign Direct Investment that helped propel the Costa Rican economy and materialize its position as an outlier in the region. In contrast, lack of institutional guarantees discouraged foreign investors from investing money into the Honduran economy. Through a deep dive into the political histories of both nations, from European discovery to modernity, I conclude that the political institutions of these Central American nations have determined their economic growth paths.