Showing 1 - 6 of 6 Items

Date: 2018-05-01

Creator: Samuel Monkman

Access: Open access

This project explores the logical structure of moral dilemmas. I introduce the notion of genuine contingent moral dilemmas, as well as basic topics in deontic logic. I then examine two formal arguments claiming that dilemmas are logically impossible. Each argument relies on certain principles of normative reasoning sometimes accepted as axioms of deontic logic. I argue that the principle of agglomeration and a statement of entailment of obligations are both not basic to ethical reasoning, concluding that dilemmas will be admissible under some logically consistent ethical theories. In the final chapter, I examine some consequences of admitting dilemmas into a theory, in particular how doing so complicates assignment of blame.

Date: 2017-08-01

Creator: Kristi A. Olson

Access: Open access

According to the trilemma claim, we cannot have all three of equality, Pareto, and freedom of occupational choice. In response to the trilemma, John Rawls famously sacrificed equality by introducing incentives. In contrast, GA Cohen and others argued that we can, in fact, have all three provided that individuals are properly motivated by an egalitarian ethos. The incentives debate, then, concerns the plausibility of the ethos solution versus the plausibility of the incentives solution. Considerable ink has been spilled on both sides of the debate. Yet, in this essay, I argue that we cannot have this debate until we clarify the terms. Once we clarify the terms, however, we might discover that there is no debate to be had. This is because, depending on how equality, Pareto, and freedom of occupational choice are interpreted, there might not be a trilemma in the first place. Specifically, I use a small but crucial distinction in how equality, the egalitarian ethos, and Pareto are assessed – what I call the internal/external distinction – to disentangle the various paths each solution – the ethos or incentives – could take. I conclude that both solutions have gained illicit plausibility by virtue of not keeping the distinction straight.

Date: 2020-01-01

Creator: Kristi A. Olson

Access: Open access

At some point in your life, you will need to allocate resources among individuals, but how should you do so? One prominent suggestion is the envy test: the envy test is satisfied when and only when no one prefers someone else’s bundle. In Part I, I explain and then reject Tom Parr’s recent attempt to justify the envy test. Yet, like Parr, I believe the envy test captures something important. Thus, in Part II, I distinguish two approaches to resource allocation. Parr’s defense of the envy test assumes what I will call an individualist approach: what matters are each individual’s preferences. In lieu of the individualist approach, I endorse the solidarity approach: what matters are everyone’s preferences. After explaining the distinction, I show that the envy test—or at least something like it—can be defended using the solidarity approach even if it cannot be defended using the individualist approach.

Date: 2023-01-01

Creator: Saul Cuevas-Landeros

Access: Open access

Throughout this project, I ‘step into the Chinese Room’ presented by philosopher John R. Searle and develop the areas where the Chinese Room Argument succeeds. I have aimed to pick out where Searle has succeeded with the Chinese Room Argument and introduce how it fits in with his school of biological naturalism, as it seems that he already had some conception of it when presenting the Argument. From here, I introduce some of the primary arguments against the Chinese Room Argument because they do not fit with Searle’s overarching theme of biological naturalism. Particularly, Searle’s conception of systems and system features is something he endorses for the biological but immediately labels as silly for the Chinese Room. Following the exposition of systems and system features, I expand on how there is a disconnect between Searle’s use of system features and his view of the Chinese Room Argument. What is so special about Searle’s conception of systems and the systems present in the Chinese Room Argument? Searle should claim that the Chinese Room is simply not the kind of thing that can think. Ultimately, Searle’s philosophy of mind leaves us with either a muddled philosophy or an invalid argument in the Chinese Room, but with much to learn and not forget to consider in the philosophy of mind, such as the important role of subjectivity in our conscious life.

Date: 2023-01-01

Creator: Evan Albers

Access: Open access

Effective Altruism has led a recent renaissance for utilitarian theory. However, it seems that despite its surge in popularity, Effective Altruism is still vulnerable to many of the critiques that plague utilitarianism. The most significant amongst these is the utility monster. I use Longtermsim, a mode of thinking that has evolved from Effective Altruism and prioritizes the far-future over the present in decision-making processes, as an example of how the unborn millions of the future might constitute a utility monster as a corporate mass. I investigate three main avenues of resolving the utility monster objection to Effective Altruism: reconsidering the use of expected value, adopting temporal discounting, and adopting average utilitarianism. I demonstrate that at best there are significant problems with these responses, and at worst, they completely fail to resolve the utility monster objection. I then conclude that if situations do exist in which the costs to the present do not intuitively justify the benefits to the far future, we must reject utilitarianism altogether.

Date: 2018-05-01

Creator: Nicholas DiStefano

Access: Open access